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Classical Music and the Subject of Modernity1
 
On the last day of 2006, The Observer published an article reporting Julian Lloyd 
Webber’s plea that classical music be restored to its former privileged place in the 
classrooms of Britain. As he told The Observer, ‘You have to be able to walk before you 
can run … Classical music is the grammar of music; it is the harmony, the melody, the 
notation … It is wrong for teachers to focus on “youth music” such as R&B instead of the 
likes of Mozart and Shostakovich … because classical music is the root of all other 
styles.’2
 
Much as we might sympathise with at least some of Lloyd Webber’s general intentions, 
there is, I believe, a fundamental misunderstanding of classical music, if it is seen as ‘the 
grammar of music’ or ‘the root of all other styles’. Much as one might hear some rock 
and pop superstars - from The Beatles to Tenacious D – as occasionally playing off, 
debasing, or even purposely contradicting classical practice, surely one cannot say that 
classical music stands at their root, even if we bear in mind that it had much to do, 
historically, with the development of notation and the tonal system. And, if we were to 
consider the history of world music, this too has seldom engaged with western classical 
music, even when it has had any exposure to it. Of course, it might well be that Lloyd 
Webber’s point works far better in reverse: classical music has often absorbed many 
other forms of music into its vocabulary and performative gestures, somehow 
transforming them into a music that is quite distinct from the sum of its parts. In this way, 
classical music may have something of the quality of an enzyme - to borrow a metaphor 
from Stephen Greenblatt3 - perhaps it is a practice that absorbs many elements (including 
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those indigenous to its own traditions), but somehow changes their meaning and content 
in ways that cannot necessarily be predicted in advance. Perhaps, then, in terms of the 
broader culture and histories of world musics, this function renders classical music more  
an exception than the norm to which all the others aspire. But would such exceptionality 
necessarily define it as a universal, transcending all other forms of music, or is it rather an 
exception in the sense of being a temporally- (and culturally-) bound deviation from the 
broader environment of world musics? This is one of the main questions I will be trying 
to address in this paper. 
 
What about the voices opposed to Lloyd Webber in the article from The Observer? Tina 
Redford, project manager at MusicLeader North West (an organisation addressing the 
professional development of music teachers), states that ‘Music education and teaching 
methods have to modernise … A music leader in a classroom has to have an intrinsic 
sense of liking and valuing young people, listening to their ideas and responding to them. 
The only way to do that is to engage with the kind of music they want to make, not what 
others want to prescribe to them. We are trying to get away from a didactic teaching style 
and classical music is seen as didactic.’   
 
Again, one may agree with some of the sentiments here, such as the desirability of a 
diversity of music within the educational environment. But there are surely some things 
here that will jar for anyone sceptical of the many recent applications of the word 
‘modernise’. This is a word that has become particularly prevalent since the 1980s, 
especially in the last decade or so (at least in the UK). Seldom does it now refer to such 
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laudable aims as, for instance, the redressing of historic inequalities, the eradication of 
poverty, or even, necessarily, the sort of progress in science that unequivocally brings an 
improvement in the human condition. As Fredric Jameson has recently quoted from 
Oskar Lafontaine’s memoir of his fate under Schroeder in Germany, “‘modernizers’ 
today understand little other than the economic and social adaptation to the supposed 
constraints of the global market … Modernity has simply become a word for the 
conformity to such economic constraints – the question of how we want to live together 
and what kind of society we want has become a completely unmodern question and is no 
longer posed at all.’ Indeed, as Jameson goes on to suggest, ‘people like Lafontaine are 
unmodern because they are still modernists – it is modernism that is unmodern – 
‘modernity’ however in the newly approved positive sense is good because it is 
postmodern.’4
 
That Tina Redford is using the term ‘modernise’ in this ‘postmodern’ sense is perhaps 
substantiated by the implication that schoolchildren are essentially customers with their 
pre-given interests and desires. This is part of a trend in education towards an insipid sort 
of naturalism that sees each person or group as a ready-made particular, best left 
unscarred by any didactic universals. It further suggests that everything good about music 
is fundamentally natural, latent in all its dimensions within the human psyche. If there is 
some symmetry between the pre-modern and the post-modern, one might wonder 
whether this represents a return to the old scholastic prohibition against curiosity in the 
unknown or unfamiliar, against changing the order at hand and violating our inborn place 
within that order.5 But the religious order that was previously protected against violation 
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is now reoccupied by that of the global market, often posing as an ideal democratic 
principle. If this sort of attitude is hardly conducive to the cultivation of classical music, 
it is surely barely any better for the health of popular music, since it tends to efface the 
resistant or oppositional elements of any music whatsoever. 
 
Given that what we call ‘classical’ music has seldom generated profits, even at the times 
of its greatest influence, it does not seem to fit so naturally into a world where, 
increasingly, everything must have its economic cost (again, the same doubtless applies 
to many other musics). Therefore, it is difficult to cultivate it as an art available to all, 
whether in terms of its audience or its creation, if it is not afforded some degree of 
privilege in education and the allocation of public or charitable resources; it requires far 
more in terms of general effort and time than most other forms of music. If it is left to 
take its place, equally, beside the other forms of music, it follows that the personal choice 
to indulge in classical music becomes increasingly expensive. The claim that classical 
music is essentially elitist and therefore does not belong to the ordinary person, becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. In an environment where the only generally agreed index of 
value is that which can be quantified – this is the essential assumption lying behind John 
Carey’s recent polemic, What Good are the Arts?6 - there is no way that anyone can 
unarguably claim that classical music has any particular value at all, especially if the only 
way to find out is for us all to fill in an endless chain of questionnaires.  
 
Most significantly – and this is perhaps the factor that has changed most over the last few 
decades - classical music culture has traditionally involved substantial amateur 
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participation in music making, whether this be in large choral societies, amateur 
instrumental groups, or simply performance alone at home. Roland Barthes and Edward 
Said, as ardent amateur classical musicians, stood out as part of a dying breed of 
intellectuals who felt that their hobby developed their thought and perception in ways that 
could not otherwise have been acquired. But nowadays it is clear that many capable 
people – outstanding intellectuals included - get by perfectly well without any encounter 
with classical music, that the demise of civilisation so often predicated on the advent of 
Rock and Roll still seems yet to materialise and, most tellingly, that august journals such 
as the London Review of Books are more likely to review monographs about Bob Dylan 
than about Beethoven.   
 
Does this all suggest that classical music essentially belongs only to the past? This will be 
another question underlying much of what I have to say, although at this stage my 
provisional answer is - frustratingly perhaps - yes and no. To begin with, we do need to 
guard against the assumption that all was somehow rosy for classical music over the last 
two centuries, that scores of respectable, decent citizens queued up in an orderly fashion 
for endless concerts and operas. Moreover, if classical music were indeed to have been so 
directly complicit in oiling the wheels of the industrialised west, we might indeed be 
correct in seeing it as of its time and now to be superseded by music more conducive to 
our age of diversity and equality. While classical music clearly has to carry the burden of 
a few threads of respectability in its genealogy – don’t we all? – its history is surely much 
more varied and ambiguous. Funding was never straightforward or even ubiquitous, nor 
was universal education in the art, whether for composers, performers or listeners. 
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Indeed, many of the inherited traditions within classical music, at least in the UK and the 
US – such as its privileged place in education or the public provision of orchestras - were 
the product of a particular high modernist mindset that reached its highpoint only in the 
middle of twentieth century.  
 
The status of classical music in western society thus seems to be highly ambiguous. 
Indeed, perhaps one of the strengths its tradition has had lies in the way it sits between 
the establishment - confirming the status quo in sound, as it were - and that which 
opposes or subverts it, challenging its secure assumptions. If I understand it aright, it is an 
art that takes inherited orders as its starting point (thus its reliance on a particularly strong 
pedagogy of harmony and counterpoint), but can also act as a critique of our assumptions. 
What I am beginning to imply is that classical music is of a piece with the fundamental 
attitudes and reflexes of modernity itself. My argument will now need to proceed by 
trying to define what both classical music and modernity might be, in order ultimately to 
give more flesh to that ‘yes and no’ answer (to the question, does it belong only to the 
past?). After that, the question would be, does classical music still belong to us and do we 
still belong to modernity? Inevitably, much of this latter line of enquiry will have to 
remain sketchy here. 
 
Is there anything substantial that can unequivocally identify classical music as more than 
merely an example of ‘music’ in the more general sense? After all, it is hard to dispute 
that there is much that classical music and most other forms of western music have in 
common in terms of melody, tonality, mode, rhythm and harmony. Greenday’s 
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‘Basketcase’ is a song that in its harmonic frame is essentially identical to Pachelbel’s 
canon. Whether or not this latter is a genuine example of the Lloyd-Webberish flow from 
the classical to the more popular, surely what is more significant is the fact that the 
similarities between these two pieces lies in the basics of the tonal system that is common 
to both genres. The bass line of Pachelbel’s canon is one of the generic expansions of the 
perfect cadence (chords V-I), which is the most fundamental dynamic impulse of the 
tonal system.  It is not surprising then, that this crops up in a variety of music - indeed, 
the same pattern underlies ‘Puff the Magic Dragon’ as well. Given that much classical 
and virtually all popular and traditional music share common tonal underpinnings, it does 
not take much to turn a classical piece into one that sounds more popular, and to 
‘classicise’ a popular one. More challenging is the fact that a piece of unadulterated 
classical music can take on an entirely different ethos if it is used in a way outside its 
customary home in the concert hall (or, increasingly, personal sound system): Vivaldi’s 
Four Seasons becomes a different, not always welcome, animal when a company 
switchboard puts us on hold for half an hour, and Wagner’s ‘Ride of the Valkeries’ is 
somehow translated into another language when heard as part of the sound track to 
Apocalypse Now. 
 
Perhaps, then, the safest way of distinguishing classical music from competing musical 
languages is to suggest that it tends to display a combination of certain tendencies or 
attitudes rather than essential qualities: e.g. it tends towards more complexity than most 
surrounding music; it usually requires the cultivation of a specific, and somewhat abstract 
method - performance technique or compositional theory - before it can be created; it 
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displays a degree of ‘written-ness’, that is, the development of the sort of sound structure 
that is sometimes best created and recorded in notation; it has a tendency to subsume 
diverse musical gestures within a broader, dialogic argument. But it is perhaps a mistake 
to identify it solely in terms of its specific musical substance. We surely have to take into 
account at least some of the attitudes and tendencies of the cultures that accompany it, 
and of which it may well also be a constitutive ingredient.7 These might include the ideal 
of listening to the music in dedicated spaces where the listener’s attention is as fully 
engaged as possible (and usually without direct physical participation); a culture in which 
the musical practices designated as classical are seen as beneficial in terms of education 
and continuing personal development. Again, a specific method is usually cultivated and 
practised, prior to the music-making proper. It also presupposes a society in which there 
is a sufficiently numerous paying public to finance both the space and the performances. 
In short, classical music is a particular historical construct that includes a menu of 
performative and receptive practices as much as specific compositional structures; it is an 
ensemble of things that came together at a specific historical juncture and therefore could 
equally well dissolve if the historical conditions accompanying its emergence begin to 
dissipate. 
 
When, then, might classical music actually have emerged? If it is essentially to be 
connected with concert-hall practice and the sense of moral self-improvement that the 
Germans termed ‘Bildung’, then its emergence would unequivocally have to belong to 
the late eighteenth century. This is the conclusion of Karol Berger’s recent searching 
study of musical modernity, where he identifies the classical style specifically with a new 
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form of human autonomy, distinct from the order of the cosmos; one in which God 
becomes a metaphor for harmony rather than, as before, harmony a metaphor for God.8 
But, if this account is correct, then Pachelbel’s Canon, Vivaldi’s Four Seasons and the 
entire works of Bach and Handel would have to count as pre-classical (as indeed they do 
in traditional historical categories of western music, where the term ‘classical’ tends to be 
more strictly reserved for the generation of Haydn to Beethoven). One way out of the 
problem of excluding music predating the ‘classical’ era (if indeed it is a problem) is 
somehow to ‘retrofit’ it as classical music. The obvious example of this is Bach’s 
Matthew Passion, which was ‘rediscovered’ by Mendelssohn in 1829 and received by the 
German public as one of the greatest of all classical works, a sort of Old Testament to the 
New of Beethoven and his followers.  
 
Another strategy might be to note how earlier music may have provided one or more of 
the vital strands that contributed to an eventual ‘full-blown’ culture of classical music: 
the development of an official ‘canon’ of music within the plainchant repertory; the 
successive emergence of modality, polyphony and rhythmic complexity; the implications 
of using notation. The place of music in the Middle Ages as one of the scholastic seven 
liberal arts (indeed on the more prestigious, theoretical side: the quadrivium) meant that 
music – as theory, at least - retained the aura of its Pythagorean links to the essential 
order of the cosmos. The eventual emergence of classical music might well be a sort of 
reoccupation of the prestigious position music had retained throughout the Middle Ages, 
both in terms of cosmic theory and its ubiquity in liturgy, court and civic life; this gave 
some of the music concerned a sense of canonic identity. Therefore, there is no obvious 
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point at which ‘early music’ ceased and ‘classical music’ began: as one model moved to 
the other, strands of the older and newer conceptions lay side by side.9
 
Nevertheless, it is striking that the roots of this continuum clearly lie in the Middle Ages. 
Most other western arts and intellectual traditions comprise a canon stretching back into 
antiquity. However much music was cultivated in the ancient world, even as something 
with striking affective powers, it never developed in any sense as a body of exemplary 
works; and, like the majority of world music, it seems to have been primarily 
monophonic. This therefore gives support to my claim that classical music (together with 
its direct historical precedents) is something exceptional even among the western arts in 
general, and is more directly connected with the history of modernity. 
 
Some aspects of classical music culture may have been partly accidental, though. At the 
outset of the seventeenth century, music that was specifically geared towards human 
emotion and expression was very much in vogue; this was a product of a humanism that 
seemed to forsake the lofty cosmic ideals of the Platonist tradition in favour of a type of 
music that mimicked, stirred and stilled the human passions (thus following the 
alternative, Aristotelian, strand in the conceptions of music inherited from the ancients).10 
This new idiom was soon to be heard in church, court and the newly emerging public 
venues, particularly those associated with opera. Yet music’s direct connection with a 
specific text did not seem as secure as the reformers might initially have imagined: for, as 
new formalising procedures emerged from an interplay of traditional techniques of 
musical construction, dance patterns and newly-expressive gestures, music seemed 
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somehow capable of pursuing a life of its own, certainly paralleling human emotion and 
the implications of text, but not necessarily confining itself to these. In other words, 
however much humanist reformers at the end of the sixteenth century (together with 
many music critics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) might have prized music 
for its supposedly ‘natural’ qualities, what was becoming increasingly effective were 
precisely its independent aspects, its deviation and modification of supposed natural 
principles. With this potential for autonomy came the sense that musical works were 
individuals, following their own implications and potentials, and thus almost of a piece 
with the individuality of those who created them. Discrete musical works also began to 
adopt a series of internal laws, checks and balances that paralleled Hobbes’s theory of the 
artificially structured state – in other words, something that eschewed the immediate 
dictates of nature in order to mediate between the competing forms of power and 
authority. 
 
Perhaps the most dynamic aspect of this developing musical culture was the tension 
between a sense of the universal and the particular: music could articulate, represent, or 
even actualise both a more conservative sense of an established order – that which 
corresponds to pedagogic method - and a radical sense of individuality. It could develop a 
feeling of alienation, resistance or even opposition to the surrounding orders. In other 
words, it worked dialectically in the sense that it could lead to results that could never 
quite accurately be predicted. If this thumbnail sketch is accurate, it describes a world of 
music utterly remote from that of the supposedly ‘modernised’ classroom, which mirrors 
the choices of its students or engages them in a range of practices cleansed of didactic, 
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methodical, content. The idea of a music that has to do with human, spiritual or moral 
order and that – simultaneously – challenges, subverts or utterly opposes such orders, 
seems to be an ontological category entirely foreign to a conception of music that 
expresses the self with the apparent spontaneity of an unmediated bodily function.  
 
Having sketched the way classical music developed within specific historical parameters, 
what do these same conditions tell us about the western modernity that I propose is of a 
piece with classical music? First, modernity itself is - in the wider course of humanity - 
the exception rather than the rule, however much we might today use terms like ‘modern’ 
and ‘modernise’ as normative categories of unlimited progress. The concept of 
modernity, which I am trying both to define and co-opt, might seem unorthodox to some 
in the field of musicology. This latter has tended to avoid the term as a broad historical 
category and generally associates the ‘modern’ with the specific stylistic category of 
‘modernism’, as applied to progressive music from the late nineteenth century to the last 
decades of the twentieth. It may well be that musicologists have avoided engagement 
with ‘modernity’ and all the broader cultural issues that this implies because of the 
autonomy that western music seems to have acquired through that very modernity, and 
specifically through the intensified ideology of modernism (thus something relatively 
recent); namely, a sense that music stands apart from all other considerations, that it is 
somehow more ‘true’ than the messy contingencies of politics, society and, specifically, 
cultural history. 
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Historians, on the other hand, have long used the broad categorisation by which the 
Ancient World is separated from the Modern World by the Middle Ages.11 Modernity 
thus has its beginnings in the era of the Renaissance and Reformation and is fed by the 
scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Culturally, it surely has 
some real presence in Montaigne, Shakespeare and Cervantes, the philosophy of Locke, 
Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza. It reaches both a peak and a crisis at the time of the 
Enlightenment and French Revolution and thereafter forges ahead with the industrial 
revolution and the increasing dominance of capitalism. It is thus tempting to divide it into 
three historical phrases, the first dating from the sixteenth century to the end of the 
eighteenth; the second, from the time of the French Revolution to the late nineteenth 
century; and the final phase characterised by modernism. By this model, the second phase 
would neatly coincide with what Karol Berger characterises as the inauguration of ‘our’ 
modernity, which is associated with the type of music traditionally termed ‘classical’ and 
‘romantic’.12 However, it is impossible to give the concept of modernity hard and fast 
chronological markers. While the Renaissance, with its restoration of a lost antiquity, 
could not be considered ‘modern’ in itself, its new oppositional mechanism – beating the 
immediate past with the stick of the ancient world - could well have been significant, 
since this was indeed something that was soon to be engaged against the very antiquity it 
previously envied. In other words, many aspects of modernity were inaugurated within 
earlier traditions, their eventual effects being entirely unanticipated when they first arose.  
 
Much also depends on particular views or national traditions, which might prioritise 
different starting points: the Reformation, for instance,13 or Descartes’ concept of the 
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self-conscious, reflexive ego, unmediated by any light other than its own, or the political 
revolutions of the late eighteenth century. Some theoretical traditions usefully define 
modernity as primarily a qualitative category – as a sort of attitude - rather than as 
chronologically bounded, thus allowing that elements of it might well appear in periods 
long before the ‘Modern’ age.14 This also allows that there can be considerable strength 
in ‘non-modern’ traditions within the age when modernity seems to dominate. Indeed, it 
may well be that modernity is liveliest when it interacts with traditions that it is either 
trying to surpass or that, in turn, challenge it. This sort of modernity thus retains a 
dynamic quality that could become ossified when that which is modern finds no 
resistance. In all, the precise bounds of modernity are thus dependent on the sort of 
narrative one adopts to explain it, as if it contains the seeds of a story that can be 
unfolded in several ways.15   
 
Well-worn theories associate modernity with various developments in the way the 
cosmos was believed to cohere: foremost is perhaps the concept of ‘disenchantment’ 
(Max Weber’s famous term), a retreat from the magical significance of the world and 
human practices, the ‘extirpation of animism’.16 With this came the view that the cosmos 
was not necessarily constructed entirely for mankind’s benefit, so that a new form of 
human initiative was required to render the natural world amenable to human purposes. 
This is what Hans Blumenberg terms the ‘burden of self-assertion’. With the new 
development of scientific method, it became necessary to adapt man to the impersonal 
reality uncovered by repeatable experimentation. But this distinction between reality and 
the human condition also brought with it the contrary tendency: to adapt that reality to the 
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needs and purposes of man.17 The most positive aspect to arise from this is the potential 
to see reality as that which is most actual and immanent, rather than as something that 
must always remain beyond our immediate experience; this might be what gives 
modernity its restless and ongoing energy.18 On the other hand, this development tends to 
drive a wedge between the natural world and human civilisation, to suggest that 
humankind is progressively alienated from the secure and harmonious place in the natural 
order that our cultural memories always seem to evoke. Hans Robert Jauss usefully 
relates this line of thinking to a trajectory leading from Rousseau to Adorno, thus 
suggesting an intellectual epoch that coincides directly with the era of modernity as I am 
trying to outline it.19 However, the sense of a growing rift between western humanity and 
nature did not necessarily prevent the re-invention of the transcendent hidden reality to 
give human orders support and justification. While the birth of the nation state is one of 
the most palpable inventions of modernity - deriving from its tendency to divide 
phenomena into manageable units (which are then rationally governed as efficiently as 
possible) - such units are invariably buoyed up by the reinvention of myths relating to 
their identity and cohesion. Again, modernity is almost always something which works in 
counterpoint with non-modern elements, the interaction often resulting in a change on 
both sides, an unpredictable synthesis that is itself rarely stable.   
  
Roughly simultaneous with the beginnings of self-assertion in the Renaissance and 
Reformation was the breakdown of the medieval chivalric tradition and the complex 
customs and interactions of various classes, dominated by aristocratic and military 
etiquette. Cervantes’ satire on the old order, Don Quixote, clearly demonstrates that this 
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had irrevocably declined by the early seventeenth century.20 What is less certain is what 
the disintegration in this order actually led to, although it clearly left a space for new 
ways of defining the self. Some commentators point to the steady breakdown of the 
assumption of resemblance and interconnectedness between all facets and dimensions of 
the world and universe (something also central to Cervantes’ satire). This has been most 
famously theorised by Foucault in recent years, but is already clearly evident in 
Descartes’ critique of inherited modes of thought: ‘Whenever people notice some 
similarity between two things, they are in the habit of ascribing to the one what they find 
true of the other, even when the two are not in that respect similar.’21 The concept of 
resemblance has undergone many forms of revival within even the strongest eras of 
modernity, most significantly in the various forms of musical Romanticism. Thus, again, 
modernity cannot be thought of as a monolithic movement, uninflected by survivals from 
the past and restorations in the present. Older elements often become spheres of 
knowledge and practice developed along their own trajectories. Moreover, the inevitable 
tensions between the various practices, ancient and modern, generate a sense of 
movement, whether positive and progressive or negative and alienating.  
 
The breakdown in the system of resemblance during the seventeenth century may well 
have led to the increasing autonomy of different activities and practices, developed more 
for their own sense of coherence than for the way they might automatically relate to other 
things.22  The development of different activities independently of one another could, 
technically, be infinite and ongoing, thus engendering a sense of openness in terms of 
both reality and the human mind.23  Something of the excitement at the opening of new 
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horizons is captured by the print of the Pillars of Hercules on the title page of Francis 
Bacon’s Instauratio Magna of 1620.24  One gets the sense of the possibility of breaking 
out of an enchanted circle of interconnected elements and that, having chosen a direction 
in which to sail, the journey could be potentially endless. Pragmatically, separation could 
also be exercised in the name of efficiency, something most obviously demonstrated in 
the concept of division of labour necessary for industrialised societies. It was precisely 
this same division of labour that facilitated the development of the modern symphony 
orchestra, where every player has a specific place and a single instrument to perfect to the 
highest possible level, through methodical practice of an approved pedagogical system. 
Modernity is thus frequently related to the development of instrumentalised rationality, 
the ability to adapt rational principles from one situation and apply them in another, thus 
progressing the material comforts of humankind. Max Weber’s conception of equal 
temperament in music as an essential element of rationalisation is, of course, particularly 
telling here. 25
 
If, in one sense modernity led, through the division of labour, to a sense of alienation, of 
being separated from some intuited organic whole, in another way it led to a 
consolidation of the individual. Given that reality has to be constructed, as much as it is 
duplicated or mirrored, the question of how it is represented from each individual 
viewpoint becomes more pressing, something obvious in the development of perspective 
in painting. The standard accounts of the development of the human subject within 
modernity tend to stress its sense of autonomy and its freedom from the constraint of the 
inherited orders into which it was born; yet this has to negotiate with other subjects in 
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order to achieve a society that is both harmonious and progressive. This approach 
immediately risks a level of generalisation, though; after all, were there not recognisable 
human subjects before the mythical dividing line between modernity and pre-modernity? 
Is not the variety of subjecthood within modernity so extremely great as to render the 
concept of a ‘modern subject’ meaningless? Charles Taylor provides a useful starting 
point by linking the growing sense of internalisation with the turn against an external, 
pre-existent order that is ‘found’ and that determines our station and role in life, towards 
a form or order that is made with our own minds; this is something made overt in 
Descartes’ work on subjectivity, particularly in the Discours de la Méthode (1637). 26  
 
Of course, something of this inward turn was evident in Augustine, but with him it was 
coupled with a sense of the moral sources as lying outside us, which are by definition 
good (like Plato’s cosmos). Descartes’ move was to make such moral sources internal to 
the individual. 27 This by no means excluded the divine origin of such internal moral 
sources, but made these independent of the order of the external world and cosmos. Thus 
the essence of modern ethical and political thought was to lie in the subject’s sense of his 
or her own dignity, something to be enhanced and developed over and above the 
disenchanted matter of the world. This was seeded in Descartes’ conception of the subject 
and later developed much more overtly in the moral system of Kant. 28 This is not to say 
that the modern subject is to take a reckless attitude towards the external world as 
something that is merely the plaything of subjectivity, but rather that the orders of nature 
do not automatically determine our inner nature, that our rationality demands that we 
accept the outside world in relation to the evidence it offers, our models for 
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understanding it always being subject to modification and improvement. Rationality is 
thus procedural rather than a substantive, ready-perfected vision of reality.   
 
Before turning more directly to the way that music might relate to this sense of modern 
subjectivity, I will briefly propose another contextual element that arose at precisely the 
same time that classical music came into being. I suggest that the sort of music emerging 
with modernity acquired much of its apparent power precisely through doing musically 
what the modern novel was doing textually, in other words, as a sort of fiction that 
brought its own, new form of ‘truth’. Catherine Gallagher relates the development of the 
‘true fiction’ of the novel specifically to modernity, to that attitude of speculation and 
scepticism which led the reader of novels to entertain speculations about the believability 
of the characters and actions, to hypothesise about motives and outcomes. This sort of 
fictionality challenged the reader in gauging the likelihood of possible outcomes, 
something vital in negotiating new forms of commerce and enterprise.29 As she 
perceptively puts it, ordinary people had to exercise the ability to suspend literal truth 
claims even in order to accept paper money. Thus, most of the developments associated 
with modernity required precisely the kind of ‘cognitive provisionality’ developed in the 
novel, a sort of fiction that was accepted and fostered for some sort of practical 
convenience. The characters of novelistic fiction are open, inviting the reader to bring 
them to life, internalised in a way that would be impossible were they to represent actual 
people. This sort of internalisation is not necessarily the direct identification that many 
critics of the bourgeois sensibility of the novel have assumed, but something much more 
open and flexible, enabling the reader to reflect on his or her own unfathomability in 
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contrast to the knowability of the novelistic character. It is thus more an exercise in 
flexible self-creation than one of recognising a completed model of oneself behind the 
text. Moreover, as Descartes tried to show in Le Monde (1664), the notion of fictional 
worlds becomes the prototype for the way we gain our knowledge of the real world, as if 
we were imitating God’s creative capabilities, trying them out on a fictional world in 
order to adapt them to the real one. The representation of the world becomes a form of 
metaphor, a representation of what things ideally should look like, rather than something 
essentially of a piece with nature, as metonymy. 30
 
Having brought up the relation of music, not only to modernity as a broad cultural 
attitude, but also to the novel, I am perhaps beginning to fall victim to a very common 
problem in recent music scholarship. This is the tendency to translate music into other 
phenomena, to reduce it to more concrete and readable models, particularly the verbal. 
However, having used such models as analogies in order to bring music out of its 
habitually autonomous territory, I now suggest that the type of music I am addressing is 
specifically important because it also helps to constitute modernity in the very process of 
reflecting it. Taking the novelistic analogy as a starting point, it is clear that most forms 
of music relate to narrative in the broadest way (that is, to a human sense of organisation 
in time, rather than necessarily to the specific implication of a storyline) and also to some 
sort of voice.31 Indeed, the latter can - as in novels - be quite multiple, but, given the way 
lines and gestures may be combined simultaneously in music, this can present multiple 
voices and associated viewpoints in a way that is entirely unique. While some forms of 
musical narrative can come closer to the novelistic than others – sonata form, for 
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instance, in its relation to novels of the Enlightenment era – what is significant is that a 
narrative element is palpable in music precisely because it is performed in time. A 
‘modern’ listener will try to piece together elements of narrative in any music which 
contains a plethora of events and gestures (even if the emerging temporality is relatively 
static or circular). Indeed, it is the implication of a stronger form of listenership – akin to 
the reader of a novel – that makes classical music so significant in the development of the 
modern subject. In hearing relationships both between figure and ground – if the music 
profiles a specific melodic line – and between events passing in time, one is not just 
testing out a possible world, as one might in reading a novel, but exercising a form of 
consciousness over time. And what is specifically significant about this form of 
consciousness is that it is purposely artificial, based on fictional musical events (rather 
than – say - an exercise in co-ordinating one’s listening with an assumed harmony of the 
spheres or one that amplifies one’s prior sense of identity).  
 
Let me suggest some of the ways in which this form of artificial (i.e. constructed) 
consciousness is different from that of a pre-modern experience. One of the most 
perceptive accounts of experience of the self in time from the ancient world is 
Augustine’s self analysis of the recitation of a psalm – thus something that could well 
have been as much a musical experience as a verbal one.32 He overcomes the problem of 
the pinpoint subjectivity of the present (i.e. the fact that our consciousness at any 
particular moment is gone as soon as it comes) by noting the persistence of the mind’s 
attention and how it is through this that what is expected passes into the memory. Before 
beginning a psalm, his faculty of expectation engages the whole, but, as he begins to 
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recite, this future expectation pours through the consciousness into the memory (perhaps 
rather like the sand in an egg-timer). From the experience of reciting a psalm, Augustine 
abstracts the way we encounter both small durations and longer, including life itself and 
the whole history of mankind. Music, in this sort of consciousness, thus helps to attune us 
to a greater reality that is entirely pre-given and to which the state of attention aligns us. 
There are of course, many other ways in which music can exercise our sense of being in 
ways that are not specifically ‘modern’ (by which I do not mean that they are by any 
means irrelevant to our own condition). Dance music can regulate a predictable flow of 
physical movements in space as well as time; music can also be used to express precisely 
the feelings we are experiencing at any particular time, the type of person we believe 
ourselves to be or the cultural group to which we belong or aspire to belong. None of 
these modes – and more – are necessarily to be excluded in the culture of classical music, 
as I have been outlining it. Where would it be, if it did not in some ways resonate with 
our emotions, confirm our beliefs or sometimes make us want to dance? Rather, I would 
suggest its crucial element is that of fictionality, of the implication of a form of 
consciousness that is not merely an amplification or confirmation of what is already 
given or expected. 
 
I do not have time to do anything more than sketch out what I mean by this relationship 
between classical music and modern subjectivity. My current work specifically addresses 
the Passions of Bach, which are significant in this regard since so much about the 
intention lying behind them is surely of a pre-modern mindset: texts concerning the 
universal sinfulness of mankind, as a state dating back to the beginnings of human time; 
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or the sovereignty of Jesus as something wound into the very fabric of the word and all 
creation. Musically, too, the textures tend towards a consistent web of harmonic certainty, 
music that is so technically confident that it might be understood to reflect the very 
unseen structure of the cosmos that surrounds us and of which we are a symptom. Yet, in 
practice, the results can be entirely surprising. When Jesus speaks only three lines in the 
long second half of the Matthew Passion, we hardly notice his absence since the large 
number of emotionally-charged arias, sung by personages constructed in our present 
rather than in the past of the story, together point to him in their varied ways. Following 
Hobbes, we might infer that the monarch is constructed through the very authority of his 
free subjects, who together ‘authorise’ him through their own intensified subjectivity. 
Moreover, in the arias themselves, there is a constant dialectic between the singers as 
personages entirely dependent on the material of the music that brings them to presence 
and their melodic independence from this web of musical connections.  
 
It is obviously impossible to gauge what all listeners – from whatever period or 
background - are likely to experience when listening to Bach’s Passion arias. All I can 
suggest is something of the possibilities of what a listener attuned to imperatives of 
modernity, as I have outlined them, might intuit (whether consciously or not). What we 
might be able to hear are abstract but emotionally-charged personages emerging in the 
course of their ariosos and arias, as musical characters who are built up through 
conformity to a pattern, or deviation and repetition. Sometimes, these characters acquire a 
sense of themselves through a subject-object duality, by which we hear a quaking heart or 
flow of tears represented in the music, but viewed at a distance by the singer (since she 
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might sing patterns independent of the pictorial figuration). This same subject-object 
relationship can work at the level of listening: we can observe the construction of a 
musical subjectivity in time as an object from our own position, or we can make the same 
musical event part of our own subjectivity as we map the vocal line onto our own 
consciousness. Following the musical events of a Bach aria can have a sense of 
directional narrative, although this is much more a feature of later music, as Berger has 
shown.33 But, in the way so much of the music is the manipulation and creative 
elaboration of an initial body of sound, there is almost the sense that our expectation is 
exercised through an increasing enlargement of our initial experience. The progress of the 
piece both confirms and expands an initial burst of musical consciousness, deepening our 
experience as if in concentric circles.  This form of subjective consciousness is quite 
different from that performed by coordinating oneself with a given external reality, like 
Augustine’s recitation of a psalm. Neither does it necessarily have a specific aim in mind, 
such as the anticipated resolution of opposing elements: it is a sort of exercise in 
consciousness in and for itself, born of the specifically Protestant imperative to develop 
personal responsibility for the cultivation of faith. 
 
Of course, my study of Bach relates to what I would call the earlier stages of musical 
modernity. But similar issues would emerge for the study of ‘classical music’ proper and 
later types. The period of the later eighteenth century brings in the obvious linear features 
of sonata form, by which the free and open dialectical elements of earlier music are now 
directed towards a level of synthesis and resolution, precisely in the way many 
contemporary novels might be structured. Again, it is not the ‘truth’ of the individual 
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elements that counts, but the way they relate, both combining and inflecting one another 
in a process we can both view objectively and map as subjects in time. This is precisely 
the type of music that can absorb other musical influences, which thereby become 
something entirely different within the course of the musical fiction. In typically 
‘modern’ fashion, much music around the turn of the nineteenth century appropriates 
elements of folk music, dance, or even ancient church polyphony, stripping them of their 
supposedly natural ‘truth’ and constructing something that is a new type of fiction. This 
is as true of music that aspires to be more naturalistic or popular, such as Italianate opera, 
all of which presupposes expert singers who have undergone rigorous institutional 
training in voice production and coloratura. As we map any of this music with our 
consciousness we might find ourselves facing particular moral quandaries. How are we to 
take it, for instance, when Mozart writes some of his most ravishingly beautiful music in 
his operas for characters we know are being flattering, dishonest or downright evil? Does 
the beauty of the music represent some sort of truth that belongs to us as listeners and 
which the singer does not directly hear? Or does the music teach us that fiction is all we 
have, but it is up to us whether we use it for good or ill? The crucial thing is that this 
music might encourage us to ask questions, feel ambiguities, try out characters, ones that 
we might not otherwise have been able to experience.  
 
Later music might radicalise the subject-object relations by rendering the music quite 
alien to our own feelings or sensations, an independent entity that is neither the 
continuous cosmos of pre-modernity nor the idealised bourgeois subject of the early 
nineteenth century. But there are countless ways in which this process might work; what 
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they all have in common is the tendency for the music concerned not to take its elements 
at face value, as a form of truth continuous with the rest of existence. They all mostly 
presuppose a form of attention that is bounded by a time frame. Many within the 
modernist mindset tend to assume that supremely autonomous music’s fictional truth is 
so refined and honest in its own integrity that it in fact outdoes any other kind of truth. It 
is supremely true because it is so distanced from the messy ambiguity of the rest of 
reality. With this in mind, it is easy to see how the later culture of classical music has so 
much contributed to its own sense of exceptionality – as something totally separate from 
the mundane - the modernist outlook is thus assumed to apply to the whole of this art of 
modernity (as I claim for it). From this point of view, the advent of a postmodern 
mindset, or at least that part of it that undoes the dichotomy of high and low culture, has 
provided a healthy corrective. But, one could ask, might we not also have lost a sort of 
productive tension between different types of culture?  
 
If we accept my thesis of classical music as not only reflective of modernity but also part 
of its very constitution, then we have to accept that it also brings with it both the positive 
and negative elements of that modernity. Human autonomy as something cultivated away 
from what seems to be naturally inherited is both wonderfully liberating and fulfilling, 
but also potentially oppressive and cruel. Artificiality enables us to escape naturalising 
prejudices and achieve things in technology, art and thought that we might never have 
believed possible. Yet it can also take us so far away from our necessary grounding in the 
world that we are in danger of destroying the environment that sustains our very 
existence. Universality, in the sense of bringing differences together and synthesising 
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them into something new, can both surpass the best qualities of the contributing factions 
or intensify the worst. Moreover, it is very easy for a dominant faction to claim 
successful synthesis of all the others and exterminate anything that remains, the cultural 
equivalent of colonialism, perhaps. I would claim that it is classical music and its 
supporting culture that expresses, represents and even constitutes all these things in 
musical time (with all the caveats that music cannot do these things ‘on its own’, without 
a certain range of preconceptions on the part of those receiving it). One can easily think 
of examples where classical music seemed to be co-opted as a force for the good – 
Beethoven’s evocation of the free human subject liberated from hierarchy or domination, 
the various forms of musical resistance to Stalinist oppression – or for the worst – the co-
option of Beethoven, Wagner and Bruckner by the Nazi regime. In its historical use, then, 
classical music might be associated with as many dangers as advantages, although it 
belongs to a modernity that is – on balance – ultimately more successful than disastrous. 
If it were entirely a ‘safe’ sort of art, I doubt if it would have the importance that I am 
trying to attribute to it.  
 
But, if we are to believe that classical music contains a specific kernel of cruelty – its 
origins in barbarism, as Horkheimer and Adorno would have said34 – this could hardly 
refer to specific aspects of musical content, since this would be to read a meaning into 
something that can really carry no stable meaning. Scepticism towards the habit of 
finding a literal meaning in anything from human culture is surely one of the greater 
achievements of modernity, but one that has frequently been eroded, even in some of the 
writing of self-proclaimed postmoderns. I suggest that it is rather the sense of mechanism 
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that is the central issue: music in modernity combines elements, plays them off against 
one another within an artificial construction, and in such a way that the listener is invited, 
as never before, to intuit meanings, resonances and significance. This is music that seems 
positively to welcome a diversity of reception, since it can work in both rhetorical and 
dialectical relation to virtually anything we bring to it.35 In a rhetorical mode of listening 
it will confirm our assumptions, beliefs or prejudices with remarkable conviction and 
certainty; in the dialectical, it will put everything we assumed into question, leading us to 
thoughts and sensations that could not necessarily have been predicted. If what is 
powerful about this music is essentially its mechanisms – its sense of ‘method’ – in other 
words, its relation to the thought processes of modernity, then one can begin to 
understand how such mechanisms can be put to a variety of uses. 
 
So what is the fate of this culture in our own time? First, it is impossible that the 
conditions of, say, the early nineteenth century can be recreated in such a way that the 
music has exactly the same, seemingly beneficial effects and cultural aura that it 
supposedly had then. The notion of ‘restoration’ is a sterile one if it is believed to take us 
back to exactly where we were once before. On the other hand, as I have argued 
elsewhere, the concept of restoration in the present is considerably more promising if it 
becomes a part of our own creative practice.36 There is also a sense in which restoration 
of past practices, values or ideas, helps to ground us in a feeling of historical continuum 
that replaces some of the roots that the more aggressive forms of post/modernism have 
tended to efface. Such roots might be entirely false, or for some people, entirely alien to 
their actual genealogy. But in many ways these roots are all we have, synthesised as they 
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are in the wake of the alienation resulting from late modernity’s purposive erasure of the 
past.37 Putting this more positively, historical roots of this kind are there for all to share, 
particularly for those who have benefited directly from some of the inclusive processes of 
western modernity and can now claim a stake in a cultural inheritance to which they were 
formerly denied access. Thus, if there is any time to break with the truism that classical 
music is essentially a bourgeois phenomenon, now is that time. 
 
Another point to consider is that what I have called ‘classical music’ has always had the 
tendency to absorb and transform gestures and vocabularies from other types of music. 
The dialectical nature of this music as a process heard in real time means that it has the 
potential to inflect whatever presuppositions we bring towards it in new stages of 
reception. In this sense, it is not necessarily worn out as historical conditions change, 
since its counterpoint of elements render it always already something that is changing 
whenever it is sounded. This is one way in which the music is, in a sense, separable from 
the wider culture from which it derived, although it is impossible to predict what sort of 
effect it might have.  
 
But there is surely no doubt that classical music has completed a certain trajectory in 
terms of the music created today (which is now often called merely ‘new music’, thus 
distinguishing it from popular or contemporary music, but also distancing it from the 
classical canon). Until, say, the 1960s there was still the sense that classical music had 
gone through a sense of progress stretching back to the late sixteenth-century. The tonal 
harmonic language seemed to develop in ways that built upon conventions of the 
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previous generation, but broke certain rules in order to push the musical language 
forwards, usually towards more complexity and expressive nuance. To Schoenberg and 
his circle the development of tonality towards free and, later, structured atonality was an 
historical inevitability. If we admire certain composers – say Tchaikovsky and Elgar, or 
those in the Italian opera tradition from Rossini to Puccini – partly because they remained 
purposely resistant to certain aspects of musical progress, and thus quite ‘modern’ in their 
own oppositional way, today it is exceptionally difficult to tell whether a contemporary 
composer is progressive, conservative, reactionary or avant garde. Ironically, composers 
who adopt the technical complexities of 1950s high modernism, or indeed the aleatoric 
procedures of experimental music, might sound curiously old-fashioned, while some of 
those who write music in a simple, modal or neo-tonal style can seem somehow authentic 
to the present (particularly if they somehow cross over with the broader culture of 
popular music). Whether or not we take ‘authenticity to the present’ as the highest 
possible cultural accolade does of course betray the extent to which we are still wedded 
to the concept of a ‘classical’ art, but the essential point here is that ‘the progressive’ now 
seems to point more to the past than to the future. 
 
With the demise of its specific trajectories, then, the culture of classical music has clearly 
changed; but this is something it shares with most of the arts. It is difficult to claim that 
this music is part of a culture that is still fully present in all its substantive aspects and 
unquestioningly to be justified as the most authentic cultural sound available. Indeed, the 
broader modern narrative of progress and historical destiny (as was evident from at least 
the end of the eighteenth century) is surely untenable as something that can simply 
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continue uninterrupted, as if all we have to do is step back onto the pathways established 
by the Enlightenment. Now, creative restoration of past practices together with 
interaction with other forms of music are not merely options in ensuring the survival of 
classical music in any form, they are absolutely imperative. Perhaps, like some of the 
most unequivocal achievements of modernity itself (universal justice, equality of rights, 
freedom of the individual, etc.), classical music is not going to endure – as if it were the 
natural order - without some form of positive effort. Thus, contrary to the protestations of 
Julian Lloyd Webber, its universality is hardly self-evident and definitely not self-
sufficient. 
 
If classical music’s integrative tendencies can still somehow operate in our time, even 
without its original sense of historical trajectory, we might also reconsider its traditional 
forms of resistance to the societal norm of its time (the same could be said of popular 
music, which is perhaps only in danger of becoming ‘too popular’ to preserve its counter-
cultural credentials).  Learning to play an instrument, applying this technique to a 
sometimes alien repertory, developing a coordination of the physical and the intellectual - 
all these are somewhat counter to much of the culture we currently experience, since 
none of these activities has an immediate purpose in our world of targets and measurable 
goals. But bringing up a new generation that works towards ends that cannot, by 
definition, be measured, might perhaps help us creatively to regenerate one particularly 
crucial strand of modernity: its striving for a world that continually challenges inherited 
prejudices and subverts the literalism of convenient, unthinking beliefs. 
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